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October 25, 1962

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SUBJECT: Meeting of the Nitze Subcommittee (October 25)

Today's meeting revealed basic organizational problems and some lack of clarity of the Subcommittee functions. Although there was a consensus that its functions had to be dovetailed with the Executive Committee, there are clear differences of outlook on operation. Some tend to see the group as an instrument for galvanizing action on projects that otherwise would not easily clear through the bureaucracy; others are just as clearly reluctant to move on anything until they have a full bureaucratic consensus. Some of this should shake down during the next few days as the problems come more clearly into focus; others probably will just continue.

On the substantive side, there were few decisions. Paul Nitze raised for consideration possible denuclearized zones in Latin America and Africa to provide an umbrella for resolving the Cuban problem. Those of us who have worked with the Germans wondered about the impact of such a step on our Central European clients. Moreover, what is the quid pro quo from the Soviet view? Perhaps a non-diffusion approach might better serve our broader purposes. The information was volunteered that ACDA was doing something along these lines, but how this would reach the Executive Committee was not clear. In this connection too (and this occurred outside the meeting) several of us discussed the references now being made to a possible tie-in of the Cuban and the Turkish cases (e.g., Walter Lippmann this morning). And it occurred to us that disarmament might be the better vehicle for such purpose than the formula cited by Lippmann.

There was some discussion of the problems connected with a possible severing of our relations with the Soviet bloc. No conclusion was drawn. However, the intelligence community raised strong objections to the proposition, arguing that such action would destroy the important intelligence collection mechanism we now have in Eastern Europe and seriously undermine our early warning capabilities.

There was no progress on the Berlin military buildup paper. This is essentially an intra-departmental Defense problem. JCS apparently

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is not prepared to accept in its present form the ISA paper on the subject, arguing that more substance is needed for governmental decision-making and commitment, and before any progress can be made a clear DoD position is needed.

The paper dealing with the problem of possible Soviet inspection of Allied traffic to Berlin was approved. It is ready for Executive Committee consideration but we promised to hold it temporarily until State and Defense give us the go-ahead.

David Klein

L. J. Legere

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